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Abstract
This thesis looks at ways of measuring the inflation expectations of economic agents, by construct-
ing a market-based measure from the inflation compensation of government bonds. Inflation
compensation is defined as the difference in yields between nominal and index-linked government
bonds leaving investors indifferent between holding the two. Inflation compensation is a true
measure of expectations only if investors are risk neutral, hence the presence of liquidity and infla-
tion risk premia is evaluated and these premia are extracted. After deriving inflation expectations
in  this  way,  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  measures  and  announcements  on  expectations  is  ana-
lysed.
  The focus is on the Euro area experience for the time period 2007 – 2015. The data used in the
analysis consists of daily prices of French government bonds, both nominal and linked to the Euro
area harmonized consumer index (HICP). The monetary policy measures evaluated are those con-
ducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the sample period, including changes to key
interest rates and non-standard monetary policy measures.
   The results show that there are clear and time-varying liquidity and inflation risk premia in the
inflation compensation. The effect of liquidity is not substantial and is stable throughout the sam-
ple reflecting good liquidity in index-linked French government bonds. The extraction of the infla-
tion risk premium is challenging due to the lack of observations and unrealistically low variance of
the survey expectations used to identify the true inflation expectations. Hence, the final expecta-
tions and inflation risk premium are obtained only at a quarterly frequency.
  The inflation compensation measure exhibits strong volatility during the sample period, at all of
5-, 10- and 15-year horizons. This would suggest that Euro area inflation expectations are weakly
anchored. Expectations fell dramatically during the height of the financial crisis in 2008, but re-
bounded quickly afterwards. The trends for the different time horizons began dispersing thereon,
reflecting growing uncertainty and deflationary fears in the short term.
  The daily series of both liquidity-adjusted and non-adjusted compensation is used in an event
study context to determine whether inflation expectations react to the ECB’s monetary policy
measures and announcements. There appears to be a positive correlation between past values of
expectations  and  the  present  ECB  rate,  and  a  negative  correlation  between  the  current  rate  and
future expectations, pointing to monetary easing being able to increase expectations when they are
low. Rate change announcements look to be well anticipated, with little change in expectations on
days of the announcements. Non-standard measures are less anticipated and they succeed in rais-
ing expectations, albeit briefly. Finally, the effects of the ECB’s expanded asset purchase pro-
gramme (EAPP) are evaluated. It appears the launch of the programme raised expectations signifi-
cantly for a while, before they fell back to previous levels during the summer of 2015. The expecta-
tions were rising again at the beginning of autumn 2015.
Keywords Inflation expectations, inflation compensation, monetary policy, yield curve, variance
ratio test, state-space-model
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51. Introduction
An integral  part  of  almost  any model  in economics is  that  economic agents make
decisions based on what they think is going to happen in the future. In other words
they must make a prediction of the future values of key economic variables, such as
income (wages in the case of individuals, profits in the case of firms), output, taxes,
asset prices (such as stock prices, interest rates and exchange rates) and, being
most relevant to this study, prices. Estimating the future price level is the same
process as estimating the rate at which prices change, hence the variable of interest
is inflation (or if prices are falling, deflation).
Given that economic agents base their behaviour on expectations, any policy-
maker wishing to affect that behaviour, or even merely to analyse it, should have a
way to measure the prevailing expectations among agents to be able to decide on
the appropriate policy measures. When focusing on prices, the relevant policymak-
er is the monetary authority charged with conducting monetary policy, usually the
central bank of a country or currency union.
Price  stability  is  almost  universally  a  key  consideration  among  central  banks’
main policy goals. Price stability is usually stated as a specific target rate of infla-
tion that the central bank has pledged to maintain. The most common inflation
target is around 2 % annually. The European Central Bank (ECB) has defined its
target as less than but close to 2 % annual growth over the medium term. The Bank
of England has a target of exactly 2 %. The Bank of Canada has a band of 1 % to 3 %
for inflation and the Reserve Bank of Australia has a target of 2 – 3 %. Conspicu-
ously lacking an explicit target rate of inflation is the U.S. Federal Reserve, which
has merely stated long-term price stability as the second part of its dual mandate.
A key way for a central bank to determine whether the policies and communica-
tion it is currently conducting are maintaining inflation close to its target, is look-
ing at the inflation expectations of agents at different time horizons. More precise-
ly looking at the variability of long-run expectations gives some indication about
6how credible the central bank’s inflation target is and how well anchored inflation
expectations are to it.
The  anchoring  of  expectations  means  how  much  long-run  expectations  react  to
new information, including price shocks. If expectations are perfectly anchored,
long-run expectations do not change at all over time, even if the economy experi-
ences current rates of inflation that are higher than the target rate. This means that
a sudden increase in for example the price of oil will not have a persistent effect on
inflation. On the other hand, weakly anchored expectations do react to new infor-
mation and a higher current rate of inflation will likely cause agents to increase
their long-run expectations. This would in turn result in higher wage demands,
which will lead to higher prices and the cycle repeats until the long-run expectation
level is met. The anchoring of inflation expectations is therefore an essential con-
sideration for a central bank attempting to maintain long-run price stability.
(Bernanke 2007)
The anchoring of inflation expectations raise the importance of central bank
credibility, in other words, do economic agents believe that the measures the cen-
tral bank is taking are sufficient to maintain price stability? This is usually con-
nected to a  discussion of  a  policy rule for  monetary policy.  The most  widely used
policy rule is the Taylor rule and related Taylor principle that states that the nomi-
nal interest rate set by the central bank should respond to changes in inflation by
more than one to one. This should then be sufficient to keep long-run inflation ex-
pectations anchored. (Gonzalez-Paramo 2007)
The  problem  for  central  banks  in  recent  years,  and  currently  especially  for  the
European Central Bank, is that firstly, the nominal interest rate has reached the
zero lower bound and cannot adjust anymore. Secondly, the problem in maintain-
ing price stability has traditionally been concerned with too high inflation, whereas
presently, in the Euro area, the problem is that of non-existent inflation and bor-
derline deflation.
This means that in order to affect inflation expectations central banks have had
to resort to non-standard monetary policy measures, i.e. measures that do not in-
volve changes to the nominal interest rate. The most prominent of these has been
the  purchase  of  public  sector  bonds  using  printed  money,  or  what  is  known  as
quantitative easing. In addition there is increased scrutiny and importance on the
7communication of central banks, including informing the public of the schedule of
current and future monetary policy measures, which is called forward guidance.
Besides the practical considerations discussed so far, expectations matter to cen-
tral banks also from a theoretical perspective. The main macroeconomic models
used  by  central  banks  today  belong  to  the  class  of  new  Keynesian  models.  These
models are derived from the utility and profit maximizing behaviour of households
and firms respectively, hence they are said to have microfoundations, and they are
forward-looking by incorporating agents’ expectations of future inflation and out-
put. The Keynesian aspect of the models comes from nominal wage or price rigidi-
ties and the consequential assumption that counter-cyclical policy measures can
ease short-term fluctuations in aggregate demand. (Walsh 2010, 329)
The  basic  form  of  the  new  Keynesian  model  is  expressed  in  two  equations;  the
expectations augmented IS curve (equation 1.1) and the new Keynesian Phillips
curve (equation 1.2):
?? = ?????? ? ?1?? (?? ? ??????) + ?? (1.1)
?? = ??????? ? ??? + ?? (1.2)
where ?? is the output gap, ?? is the nominal interest rate, ?? is the inflation rate, ?
is a parameter of how the output gap responds to changes in the real interest rate,
? is a parameter of how current inflation depends on expected inflation, ? is a term
describing the degree of price rigidity and ?? and ??  are disturbances. The IS curve
describes the demand side of the economy and is derived from the Euler condition
placed on the representative households’s decision problem and the Phillips curve
describes the supply side and is derived from firms’ optimal pricing decisions.
(Walsh 2010, 330-340)
This  model  has  become  the  standard  framework  for  monetary  policy  analysis
since the mid 1990s (Walsh 2010, 329). As both the demand and supply side equa-
tions contain the term for expected future inflation, the measurement and under-
standing of these expectations is surely a key concern for a central bank when ana-
lysing its monetary policy measures in the context of the new Keynesian model.
81.1 Research question and methodology
The purpose of  this  thesis  is  to provide a practical  empirical  measure of  inflation
expectations in the Euro area and to appraise the interaction between the Europe-
an Central Bank’s monetary policy and the expectations. The main motivation for
the relevance of the question has been provided in the discussion so far. Particular-
ly  having a daily  (and in some cases even intraday) market  based measure of  ex-
pectations allows a robust analysis of the immediate effects of monetary policy
measures.
The specific relevance of inflation expectations in the Euro area is due to the his-
torically low levels of inflation and inflation expectations of the past few years and
the  introduction  of  the  non-standard  monetary  policy  measures  by  the  ECB  as
mentioned before. Chief among these was the introduction of the ECB’s expanded
asset purchase programme (EAPP) in January 2015. Indeed the two issues are in-
tricately linked given that the ECB’s chairman Mario Draghi mentioned historically
low inflation expectations as one of the main reasons behind the ECB’s decision to
implement the EAPP. It is therefore adequate to look at market based inflation ex-
pectations leading up to the beginning of  2015 and gauge what impact  if  any the
asset purchase programme has had so far.
The emphasis in the study is on the technical considerations in observing the
markets’ forecast for inflation. The discussion on expectations formation mecha-
nisms is therefore excluded. We will simply follow convention and assume that
agents have rational  expectations.  We touch briefly  upon the criticism levelled at
rational expectations, especially in the context of inflation expectations and its rel-
evance to the potency of monetary policy in section 2.1.
We will also not attempt to evaluate the accuracy or predictive power of the mar-
ket based expectations we produce. We are interested only, much as a central bank
would, on the current level of expectations and its implications for monetary poli-
cy. The forecasting performance of different methods, especially surveys, is again
briefly discussed in section 2.1.
The method for estimating the expectations is to look at the price differences of
nominal and inflation-linked government bonds, a concept known as inflation
compensation, or break-even inflation. Inflation compensation is defined as the
extra yield investors require to hold nominal government bonds compared with
otherwise identical inflation-linked bonds. The exact methodology follows Gur-
9kaynak,  Sack  &  Wright  (2010),  who  place  emphasis  on  the  likelihood  of  liquidity
and inflation risk premia inherent in inflation compensation. The true inflation
expectations can therefore only be produced by extracting the aforementioned
premia from the measure of compensation.
After computing this measure of inflation expectations, we assess the effective-
ness of  the ECB’s  monetary policy.  We look at  both changes to interest  rates and
non-standard measures as well as the ECB’s communication on both measures.
Combined with the expectations for different horizons, this analysis will give some
indication whether inflation expectations have remained well anchored through
the turbulence in the Euro area in recent years and if not, has the ECB been able to
bring medium to long-run expectations back closer to its inflation target.
The specific contribution of this thesis to the literature is to look at the Euro area
experience of the interaction between monetary policy and market based measures
of inflation expectations. There are studies focusing on the interaction of market
based expectations and macroeconomic news announcements (for example Gur-
kaynak,  Sack  &  Swanson  2005  and  Kitsul  &  Wright  2012  for  U.S.  data)  and  the
surprise component in ECB announcements (Winkelmann, Bibinger & Lintzert
2014), but not specifically between inflation expectations and monetary policy.
There is also a dearth of prominent studies on Euro area inflation expectations
during the sovereign debt crisis period. In particular, there has not yet been a
meaningful analysis of the effects of the EAPP given the short period of time since
its announcement.
1.2 Thesis structure
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review of the existing lit-
erature on empirical measurement of inflation expectations. This starts off by look-
ing at results gained from surveys conducted to both households and professional
forecasters, including observations about the nature of inflation expectations. Next
we look at results gained using similar methodology to the one used in this study,
i.e. studies using inflation compensation as a measure for inflation expectations.
Finally we look at the most recent development in market based measures of infla-
tion expectations, namely options-implied probability density functions for infla-
tion, which provide an estimate of the uncertainty linked to future inflation in ad-
dition to a point estimate.
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Chapter 3 introduces the main methodology used in the empirical analysis. It be-
gins with the formation of the nominal and real yield curves for government bonds
from which the inflation compensation can be calculated. Next we present the var-
iance ratio test to determine the existence of the liquidity and inflation risk premia
and then how to extract them from the compensation using a simple linear regres-
sion for the liquidity premium and a state-space model  for  the inflation risk pre-
mium.  Finally  we  go  through  the  methods  of  looking  at  the  interaction  between
inflation expectations and monetary policy by running an event study on the ECB
monetary policy announcements. This includes several linear regression models
regressing inflation expectations on the ECB’s key rate and time dummies for an-
nouncements  as  well  as  a  VAR  model  looking  at  the  interaction  between  the  key
rate and expectations. The section ends with an appraisal of the effects of the
EAPP.
Chapter 4 introduces the data to be used in the analysis, mainly the characteris-
tics  of  the  French  government  bonds,  in  particular  the  bonds  linked  to  the  Euro
area consumer price index, used for the yield curve estimation, and the ECB’s
monetary policy variables. Chapter 5 contains the results from the empirical analy-
sis following the methodology laid out in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6 concludes.
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2. Review of the literature
The measurement of prevailing inflation expectations among economic agents has
been fixed closely with the development of financial markets and instruments. Es-
pecially in recent times, since the mid-2000s, there has been an increase in the
amount of assets and derivatives, whose payoff is directly linked to inflation. This
has followed from an increased willingness among investors to have direct hedging
against future inflation outcomes. This development is of advantage to economists
who now have better and more flexible methods to gauge a market based measure
of inflation expectations from the price movements of these assets.
This chapter presents the existing literature of estimating a direct measure of ex-
pectations. It is structured in chronological order, beginning with survey expecta-
tions, which have been for most of the time the common as well as the only availa-
ble method of measuring expectations1. We then look at results gained from simi-
lar  methods that  will  be used in this  thesis,  using inflation compensation of  gov-
ernment bonds. This methodology became available when governments began is-
suing debt tied to the relevant consumer price index of  the Euro area around the
turn of the millennium. Finally we review the most recent development in expecta-
tions measurement, that of inflation options and the probability density functions
for future inflation that can be extracted from them using options pricing theory.
2.1 Survey measures
Before the development of financial instruments tied to inflation, the only way for
policymakers to evaluate actual inflation expectations of agents was through direct
1 Besides surveys, there is a rich literature of measuring expectations indirectly by using a theoretical model,
such as the Phillips curve, containing expectations and some assumption on the formation mechanism of
these expectations. The model and expectations hypothesis are then empirically tested jointly. (Kuismanen
& Spolander 1994, 7) However the focus of this study is on direct measurement of expectations, hence we
omit these kinds of indirect measures from the review.
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surveys. Surveys of expectations are still gathered however, to produce an inde-
pendent measure to complement market based measures. The participants of sur-
veys can be both professional forecasters, such as economists and financial mar-
kets professionals, as well as the general public.
In general there are three types of inflation surveys. Firstly, broader categorical
surveys asking respondents whether they believe prices will go up, down or remain
the  same  during  a  specific  time  period,  often  one  year  into  the  future.  Secondly,
quantitative  surveys  asking  for  a  range  for  future  inflation,  such  as  between  1  %
and 3 %. Thirdly, quantitative point estimates of future inflation giving a discrete
forecast, such as 2 %. (Kuismanen & Spolander 1994, 8). Currently, in addition to a
point estimate, respondents can be asked for density forecasts around the point
estimate, giving more information about the uncertainty of the forecasts. This is
usually only included in surveys directed at professional forecasters, as is the case
for the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the ECB that will be
used later in the analysis. (European Central Bank 2015b)
The evidence of the usefulness of survey measures of inflation expectations as a
source of information for a central bank’s monetary policy decisions is mixed. Berk
(1999) uses survey data of Dutch inflation expectations and finds that the derived
expectations are cointegrated with future realized inflation and the forecast errors
are stationary, which support the notion that survey expectations have informa-
tional  value  for  monetary  policy.  However  this  conclusion  is  tempered  with  the
observation that there appears to be no causal relationship between expected infla-
tion and future inflation, hence care is advised in the use of survey data for policy
purposes.
In general, survey measures have performed very well in predicting future infla-
tion, at least in the short-run. Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) find that survey fore-
casts for inflation outperform three other forecast methods, including ARIMA
time-series models of historical inflation, regression forecasts based on the Phillips
curve using real economic activity measures and VAR models using the term struc-
ture of interest rates. They use survey measures of both professional forecasters
and the general  public  and find that,  though the professional  forecasters perform
better, even the surveys of consumers outperform the other aforementioned fore-
casts. Fama and Gibbons (1984) compare forecasts from the term structure of in-
terest rates and surveys, and find the surveys providing inferior estimates, alt-
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hough their study was conducted at the time when inflation had only just ceased to
be high, making comparisons between the two studies difficult. In any case it
seems worthwhile using survey expectations as a benchmark in this study, alt-
hough we will employ expectations of medium to long-term inflation and not the
short-term.
The other main reason to look at survey expectations beside for forecasting is to
determine if inflation expectations are rational. Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003)
look at  whether the survey estimate of  inflation can predict  the forecast  errors of
the same surveys, which under rationality should not be possible. They report that
rationality  holds  for  two  out  of  the  four  surveys  they  use  in  the  study.  They  also
find autocorrelation in the forecast errors for all surveys, implying that errors are
persistent and that there is information in past errors that agents are not correct-
ing for, again a violation of rationality. Thomas (1999) performs a similar analysis
and finds that agents do not incorporate all available information on macroeco-
nomic variables into their forecasts, hence also rejecting rationality.
The rationality or lack thereof of expectations does matter for the purposes of a
central bank’s monetary policy. This is due to the main class of new classical mod-
els, which argue that, if agents are fully rational, monetary policy cannot be effec-
tive unless it  is  unexpected,  in other words unless the policymaker is  able to sur-
prise the public. However if the expectations of individuals are not fully rational,
this would no longer be the case, and even rules-based, predictable monetary poli-
cy can be effective. (Thomas 1999, 125)
Furthermore, one direct consequence of rational expectations is the efficient
market hypothesis, which leads directly to the random walk hypothesis. These are
mainly applied to stock market fluctuations, but can be extended to expectations of
any stochastic process. The reasoning is that rational investors will use all available
information to make forecasts on future stock prices. They will then buy the stocks
they expect will have higher returns and sell stocks they expect will have lower re-
turns. From this it follows that the expectations of the investors become built into
the stock prices and the risk-adjusted expected return of all stocks are equal.
Hence the only factors that can change stock prices are surprise random shocks
that  are unknown at  the time of  the forecasts.  (Sargent 2008).  The random walk
property of inflation expectations, assuming rational expectations, is used to de-
termine the existence of liquidity and inflation risk premia in section 3.2.1.
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There are a few well documented practical issues with surveys, which in particu-
lar can be improved upon by market based measures of expectations. Firstly, as
with all survey based data, the measure of expectations is susceptible to sampling
errors and possible departures from the assumed underlying probability distribu-
tion. Furthermore there is evidence of sensitivity regarding the phrasing and fram-
ing of the questionnaire. Finally and most relevantly compared to market based
measures,  survey  expectations  are  not  based  on  observed  behaviour,  nor  is  there
evidence  that  the  respondents  act  corresponding  to  the  views  they  present.  This
would be confirmed only through market transactions, which surveys are unable to
capture, but market-based measures by definition can. (Berk 1999, 1467-1468)
2.2 Inflation compensation
Most of the problems associated with survey measures of inflation expectations
can be corrected by using a measure derived from the actual behaviour of financial
markets participants. Given that investors are staking their own funds on bets on
future inflation it seems evident that these bets represent their best estimate of
future inflation.
The simplest and most common assets linked to inflation are index-linked gov-
ernment bonds, whose coupon and principal are linked to a consumer price index2.
The idea of inflation linked bonds is nothing new, indeed the first known bonds
issued in real terms were issued by the State of Massachusetts in 1780. Until
roughly the last 30 years though, only a very small proportion of government debt
was in fact linked to inflation. The main reason for issuing real bonds before that
time was mainly out of necessity for governments to raise funds during periods of
high inflation. (Garcia & Van Rixtel 2007, 11)
In the 1980s governments began issuing inflation-linked bonds for policy rea-
sons. By issuing the debt, the governments were showing that they were commit-
ted  to  ensuring  price  stability  and  also  they  were  able  to  reduce  their  borrowing
costs by eliminating the inflation risk premium that is priced into nominal bonds.
Furthermore governments explain the issuance of these bonds as completing mar-
kets by giving investors a credible way to hedge against inflation outcomes. The
final catalyst for the expansion of inflation-linked debt markets was the arrival of
2 A more extended description of the technical aspects of inflation-linked bonds is provided in chapters 3
and 4.
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the United States on the scene with the issuance of the first treasury inflation pro-
tected  security  (TIPS)  in  1997  and,  with  the  formation  of  the  Euro  area,  bonds
linked to Euro area inflation. (Garcia & Van Rixtel 2007, 9)
The development of the index-linked bonds market, with the increase in the
number of issues and growing trading activity and liquidity, enables central banks
to gauge the markets expectation of future inflation. When comparing the price or
yield of an index-linked bond to a nominal bond with identical characteristics, the
only difference should be the expected rate of inflation at maturity. In other words,
this measure of inflation compensation is the rate of expected inflation that if real-
ized, means the return of a nominal and index-linked bond is equal.
As mentioned before, inflation compensation can be artificially high due to infla-
tion risk premia in the nominal bonds and artificially low due to liquidity premia in
index-linked bonds. Much of the literature on using inflation compensation to es-
timate inflation expectations concentrates on the extraction or elimination of these
premia. The methodology used in this thesis follows Gurkaynak et al. (2010) and is
presented  in  section  3.2.2.  They  look  at  U.S.  Treasury  bonds  for  the  time  period
1999-2009 and find clear liquidity and inflation risk premia in the TIPS. Their fi-
nal  measure  of  five  and  ten  year  ahead  inflation  expectations  is  fairly  steady  be-
tween 2,3 % and 2,9 % throughout the sample only dropping sharply at the onset
of the financial markets turmoil in 2008.
Many of the earlier studies using mainly data on U.K. index-linked bonds, the on-
ly regularly traded index-linked bonds at the time, simply assume that there is no
inflation risk premium or that it is constant over time. Evans (1998) also uses U.K.
data and derives a yield curve formulation from an asset pricing model to compare
the term structure of nominal and index-linked bonds. He finds a significant and
time-varying inflation risk premium in the nominal bonds. Ejsing, Garcia and
Werner (2007) compare Euro area inflation compensation to inflation swaps and
find that the measure of inflation expectations derived from the government bond
prices contains seasonal variation. This is due to the reference price index having
seasonal  variation and it  affects  the shape of  the real  yield curve at  short  maturi-
ties. Given that we will look at medium to long-term expectations and eliminate
short-term maturity bonds from the yield curve due to their high price volatility,
we will omit correcting for seasonal effects from our analysis. It is however an im-
portant consideration for studies looking at shorter-term expectations.
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 Jochman, Koop and Potter (2008) consider the process of inflation expectations
by comparing short-run and long-run expectations derived from TIPS. To see how
anchored expectations are, they look at the inflation pass through coefficient,
which determines how changes in expectations at one horizon transfer to another
horizon. They find that expectations are not perfectly anchored, but rather con-
tained inside a reasonably narrow band.
As mentioned earlier,  the majority  of  the studies using the measure of  inflation
compensation to estimate inflation expectations use data from the time before the
Euro area sovereign debt crisis, with most samples barely containing the U.S. sub-
prime  crisis.  Our  sample  on  the  other  hand  begins  just  before  the  crisis  in  2007
and comparing the level of inflation compensation we derive with much of the ex-
isting literature, it seems clear inflation expectations have decreased significantly,
especially during the past few years.
2.3 Options-implied probability density functions3
Since the mid-2000s, there has been significant development in the number and
variety of financial instruments and derivatives where the payoff is linked to future
inflation. Inflation swaps for instance are over-the-counter contracts providing
inflation protection and are currently the most popular and liquid inflation deriva-
tive available. In an inflation swap, one party wishing to hedge against inflation,
called an inflation receiver, agrees to pay a fixed rate to another party called an
inflation payer, who in return makes a floating rate payment which is linked to the
realized inflation at the time of maturity. The observed market rate is the fixed rate
payment and, under risk-neutrality, it is the direct market expectation of inflation
at the time of maturity. If investors are risk-averse it will be the expectation plus a
risk premium. (Hurd & Relleen 2006, 25-26)
Haubrich,  Pennachi  and  Ritchken  (2012)  note  that  real  yields  derived  from  the
difference between yields of nominal government bonds and the market rate of
inflation swaps depend less on the variability of liquidity than index-linked gov-
ernment bonds and are hence a superior method to estimate inflation compensa-
tion  than  the  methods  discussed  in  section  2.2.  They  use  data  from  all  three
measures of inflation expectations discussed so far, surveys, index-linked bonds
3 The methods described in this section would have been the preferred methodology for this thesis, but
unfortunately data on the over-the-counter prices of the options were not publically available.
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and swaps, to perform a comprehensive decomposition of the derived inflation
compensation into real interest rate, expected inflation and long-term inflation
components as well as a time varying stochastic risk premium. They find that the
short-term real interest rate and expected inflation are highly volatile, but long-
term expectations fairly stable and decreasing through their sample of 1982-2010.
An even more recent development in inflation derivatives are inflation options,
commonly referred to as inflation caps and floors.  These are contracts  where the
buyer  of  a  cap  will  be  compensated  if  inflation  is  above  a  certain  strike  rate k at
time n. More precisely they will receive a fraction of a nominal underlying princi-
pal given by:
max?((1 + ?(?))? ? (1 + ?)? , 0) (2.1)
An inflation floor works similarly, except the payment will be made if inflation is
below  a  certain  threshold,  hence  the  terms  in  (2.1)  will  be  reversed.  Naturally  if
inflation  turns  out  to  be  below  the  cap  or  above  the  floor,  the  option  will  expire
out-of-the money. (Kitsul & Wright 2012, 3)
In practice, an inflation cap or floor is often a bundle of caplets and floorlets that
have the above payment structure with identical strikes and notional and which
expire in consecutive years. The option then pays out only in years when realized
inflation is above or below the strike rate. These are called year-on-year inflation
options, while the caplets and floorlets trade as zero coupon options. As with infla-
tion swaps, these instruments are also traded only on a bilateral basis over-the-
counter. (Smith 2012, 225-226)
The option-like structure of these contracts makes it possible to use option pric-
ing theory to produce the entire probability density function (pdf) of investors’ be-
liefs about future inflation and not just a point estimate. This provides policymak-
ers with much richer information about the dispersion and uncertainty linked to
prevailing inflation expectations than inflation compensation or inflation swaps.
(Kitsul & Wright 2012, 1-2)
The investors will enter into the option contract only if they believe that the
probability  of  the  payoff  matches  the  price  of  the  option.  In  other  words  a  buyer
will only agree to pay the price of the option if they believe inflation will be suffi-
ciently higher than the strike, and likewise the seller is willing to enter the contract
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only if they believe the price will be higher than the payoff. The process of generat-
ing the pdfs consists then of fitting a probability distribution to the set of observed
prices and strikes. (Smith 2012, 225)
The  standard  technical  procedure  for  fitting  pdfs  to  observed  options  prices  is
presented by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). They find that the pdf is related to
the  second  partial  derivative  of  the  call-price  function  with  respect  to  the  strike.
Using the pricing model developed by Cox and Ross (1976) the price of a call op-
tion (or inflation cap) C is defined as:
?(?,?,?) = ???? ? (?? ? ?)?(??)????? (2.2)
where ?? is the value of the underlying asset at time T, X is the strike price, r is the
risk-free rate and t is the maturity of the option. The pdf ?(??) is then defined as
the second partial derivative of (2.2) with respect to X, yielding:
?(??) = ???? ???(?, ?, ?)???? (2.3)
The actual process of fitting the pdfs is far from straightforward owing to the
complex payoff structure of the options and limited amount of observed prices,
meaning that a continuous call-price function is not observed. To counter these
issues some form of interpolation of the observed prices must be performed in or-
der to produce fitted prices for the missing maturities and then the individual
caplets and floorlets prices can be extracted. (Smith 2012, 233)
Furthermore it should be noted that the pdfs obtained in this way will again only
reflect investors true expectations about inflation if they are risk-neutral, hence
these are called risk neutral densities. A physical density function, assuming risk
aversion,  will  take  into  account  the  fact  that  investors  will  value  positive  payoffs
more  in  adverse  states  of  the  world.  In  other  words  investors  are  willing  to  pay
more for an inflation option that  provides positive cash flow in the event of  high
inflation or deflation. This increase in the price reflects a risk premium and not a
view that these adverse conditions are more probable. Since the risk neutral densi-
ties do not account for that, the tails of the distribution will be artificially fat.
(Smith 2012, 227-228)
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Smith (2012) produces options-implied pdfs for U.K. inflation for the period of
2008-2012 using year-on-year options based on U.K.  CPI inflation.  He finds that
the mean of  the distributions,  which corresponds to the fixed rate of  an inflation
swap, is relatively flat throughout the sample, especially after the first few years
from the day of the observation. The standard deviation of the distributions how-
ever, measuring the uncertainty of investors about future inflation, increased sub-
stantially after 2008, with a peak approximately five-years into the future.
Kitsul  and  Wright  (2012)  look  at  U.S.  data  using  a  simpler  methodology  to  ex-
tract discrete pdfs from zero coupon caps and floors. They then run an event study
to see which events affect  the probability  of  deflation or high inflation.  They also
produce physical density functions using a variety of time series models designed
to forecast inflation and compare the ratio between the risk neutral densities and
the physical densities to construct an empirical pricing kernel that accounts for the
risk premium.
They report that surprise macroeconomic news announcements on the whole do
not have a significant effect on the pdfs. Interestingly in the context of this thesis,
they find that meetings of the federal open market committee (FOMC) of the Fed-
eral Reserve, which announce changes to the Fed’s monetary policy, have no effect
on the risk of deflation. The estimated pricing kernels confirm the theory that in-
vestors have higher marginal utility of payoffs in the tails of the distributions, i.e.
during deflation or high inflation.
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3. Methodology
As discussed in section 2.2, a standard method of estimating the inflation expecta-
tions of a single country has long been comparing the difference between nominal
and real yields of government bonds issued by that country, called inflation com-
pensation or breakeven inflation. This is done by comparing the yield on a nominal
bond to the yield of a similar inflation index-linked bond. A nominal government
bond pays the holder a coupon annually or biannually and the principal at maturi-
ty. An index-linked government bond pays a coupon similarly, but the principal
payment is multiplied by the reference consumer price index of the country in
question. The inflation compensation is calculated from nominal and index-linked
bonds of similar maturity and coupon, so that the only difference between the
bonds is the inflation compensation.
With the formation of the Euro area, a new consumer price index was formed for
it (the harmonized index for consumer prices excluding tobacco, hereon referred to
as  HICPxT)  and  subsequently  a  whole  range  of  new  financial  markets  products
based on it. Eurozone governments have begun issuing index-linked sovereign
debt based on the Euro area HICPxT and so now it is possible to estimate inflation
compensation for the Euro area by comparing the yields on these bonds to nomi-
nal bonds issued by the same government.
Governments only issue bonds for a limited (in the case of inflation linked bonds
very limited) and discrete number of maturities. Thus it is necessary to fit a yield
curve for both the nominal and index-linked bonds to calculate the nominal and
real  yield  (or  discount  factor)  for  any  horizon  and  then  derive  the  inflation  com-
pensation from these.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: first we describe the method for fitting
the yield curve to the observed yields and maturities  of  the different government
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bonds.  We then concentrate on how to calculate the inflation compensation from
the yields and how to extract  inflation expectations from the compensation when
taking into account the inflation risk premium and liquidity premium. Finally we
look at the event study regression of the derived measure of inflation expectations
on the key ECB policy rate and time dummies relating to ECB policy announce-
ments as well as a VAR model and a trend comparison of time periods before and
after the announcement of the ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme.
3.1 Yield curve fitting
The first step when beginning to fit a yield curve to the market data is to convert
the observed bond prices, coupons and maturities into yields. For a zero-coupon
bond the continuously compounded yield is:
??(?) = ? ln? ?(?)? (3.1)
where ??(?) represents the value today to an investor of a €1 payment n years from
now. (Gurkaynak et al. 2010, 72-73)
For a coupon bearing bond the calculation of the yield is more complicated as it
has to take into account the coupon rate as well as the price. The main concept we
look at in this section regarding the yield of a coupon bearing bond is the yield-to-
maturity measure. After that we look at the formulation for the yield curve itself, in
this case utilizing the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson yield curve function.
3.1.1 Yield-to-maturity
A common method used among finance practitioners is the yield-to-maturity
measure, which connects the price of a bond at any given time to the face value of
the bond. The yield-to-maturity can be calculated from the formula for the present
value of a bond:
?? =? ?(1 + ?)??
???
+ ??(1 + ?)? (3.2)
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where the present value PV corresponds to the observed bond price, C is the cou-
pon rate, the face value FV corresponds to the principal payment at maturity and r
is  the discount factor.  Solving (3.2)  for  r  gives the yield-to-maturity.  (Tuckman &
Serrat 2011, 100)
For more than one coupon payment the yield-to-maturity cannot however be cal-
culated algebraically, so numerical methods must be used instead. We calculate the
yield-to-maturity using the YIELD-function in Excel, which utilizes Newton’s
method. The basic formula for Newton’s method is:
?? = ? ?? ?? ?(??)??(??) (3.3)
where ??  and ??  correspond to the first and second approximation for the true yield
respectively. ?(??) is defined as PVa – P, where PVa is the value of (3.2) when using
the discount factor ??  and P is the true observed bond price. ??(??) is the first de-
rivative of ?(??). The value for ??  can be obtained from an approximation for the
yield-to-maturity. A commonly used formula for this approximation is:
?? = ? ? ? ?? ? ????? + ??2 (3.4)
  To  calculate  the  true  yield,  (3.4)  is  plugged  into  (3.3)  and  the  algorithm  is  then
run  for  as  many  iterations  as  necessary  to  achieve  a  close  enough  result.  The
YIELD-function in Excel automatically runs 100 iterations. (Deeley 2008, 2-6)
3.1.2 The Nelson-Siegel-Svensson yield curve
The  methods  for  constructing  a  yield  curve  from  observed  market  data  can  be
roughly divided into parametric and non-parametric methods. Non-parametric
methods, sometimes referred to as spline-based methods, make no assumption
about the functional form of the curve and the number of parameters is not fixed,
but  growing  with  the  number  of  data  observations.  Parametric  methods  on  the
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other hand have a fixed number of parameters and a clearly defined functional
form. (Gurkaynak et al. 2006, 11-13)
In the case of yield curve fitting the choice between a parametric and non-
parametric method comes down to the intended use of the curve. For excess return
forecasting,  a  non-parametric  method can prove to be superior due to the lack of
information loss that is present in a parametric model. The resulting curve usually
fits the data well, but the smoothness of the curve suffers. (Gurkaynak et al. 2006,
12)
For a broader macroeconomic analysis of the yield curve, the loss of information
is less relevant, but there are clear advantages of using a defined functional form.
Firstly  it  eliminates  the  effects  of  small  changes  to  the  yields  of  individual  bonds
that are not due to macroeconomic shocks, making the analysis easier. Secondly a
correctly chosen functional form will have appealing properties, such as beginning
and ending at estimated parameters and having a typical yield curve shape, namely
being monotonic and S-shaped or humped. (Gurkaynak et al. 2010, 74) (Nelson &
Siegel 1987, 473)
A  commonly  used  functional  form  for  the  yield  curve,  used  by  most  central
banks, is the Nelson-Siegel-Svensson yield curve (hereon referred to as NSS), as
proposed originally by Nelson and Siegel (1987) and later complemented by Svens-
son  (1994).  To  derive  a  function  that  gives  the  desired  shapes  described  above,
Nelson and Siegel (1987, 474-475) begin by assuming that the final functional form
must be a solution to differential equation. A further assumption is that spot inter-
est rates follow from a differential equation and forward rates, being forecasts of
spot rates, must be solutions to these difference equations.
They then propose that the instantaneous forward rate at maturity m, ?(?), is
the solution to a second-order differential equation, with two identical real roots,
of the form:
??(?) = ?? + ?? ? exp ???? ? + ?? ???? ? ? exp ???? ??? (3.5)
To calculate yield as a function of maturity, ?(?), (3.5) is integrated from zero to
m and divided by m to obtain the following function4:
4 See Appendix A.
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??(?)?? = ?? + (?? + ??) ? 1 ? exp ???? ??
?
? ?? ? exp ???? ? (3.6)
The curve consists of three parts: long, short and medium -term components cor-
responding to the parameters ?0, ?1 and ?2 respectively. This is apparent from the
forms of the different sections in (3.5). The long-term component is simply a con-
stant given by the value of ?0. This is often interpreted as the long-run prevailing
interest rate.  The medium-term component has the form ?(?) = ????,  which be-
gins at zero and decays monotonically back to zero. The short-term component has
the form ?(?) = ???,  which  has  a  non-zero  starting  value  and  has  a  faster  decay
monotonically to zero. The different monotonic, S-shaped or humped-shaped
curves can be created through different values of ?0, ?1 and ?2. The parameter ? is a
time constant, which determines the rate at which the short and medium -term
components decay to zero.
To improve the fit and flexibility of the model especially at long maturities,
Svensson (1994, 6) introduces a fourth component to the yield function giving it a
second  hump.  The  functional  form  for  the  instantaneous  forward  rate  now  be-
comes:
??(?) = ?? + ?? ? exp ??????+ ?? ????? ? ? exp ???????+ ?? ????? ? ? exp ??????? (3.7)
As before to obtain the yield as a function of the maturity, (3.7) is integrated from
zero to m and divided by m to get:
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??(?)??? = ?? + ?? 1 ? exp ???????
??
+ ?? ?? ? exp ???????
??
? ?exp ???
??
??
+ ?? ?? ? exp ???????
??
? ?exp ???
??
??
(3.8)
There are now six parameters in the model to be estimated: ?0, ?1, ?2??3, ?1 and ?2.
The  interpretation  of  the  parameters  is  the  same  as  before,  only  now  ?3 controls
the shape of  the second hump and ?2 its  rate of  decay to zero.  For computational
reasons we note that ?1 and ?2 should be non-zero.
This is the final model that will be used in fitting the yield curve. Following Gur-
kaynak et  al.  (2010,  74-75),  the parameters in (3.8) are chosen so as to minimize
the sum of squared deviations between the fitted and actual yields5:
????(??(?)??? ? ??(?)???)? (3.9)
As this cannot be done analytically we must again use numerical methods to find
the minimum.
3.2 Inflation compensation and inflation expectations
The NSS-curve gives a continuous set of yields for any maturity, making the com-
parison  of  real  and  nominal  yields  now  possible.  The  NSS-curve  is  fitted  both  to
the index-linked and nominal government bonds, from which ??(?)????  and
??(?)???  can be calculated. Following from the Fisher equation, which defines the
ex-ante real interest rate as the nominal interest rate minus expected inflation,
inflation compensation is simply defined as:
5 The authors use the deviation between actual and fitted prices, weighted by the inverse duration of each
individual bond. The use of unweighted yields is in essence the same procedure. (Gurkaynak et al. 2006, 15)
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??
?(?) = ??(?)??? ? ??(?)???? (3.10)
In other words, inflation compensation gives the rate of inflation that if realized
would give investors an identical return on an index-linked and nominal bond.
(Gurkaynak et al. 2010, 76)
However inflation compensation is a direct estimate of inflation expectations on-
ly if investors are assumed to be risk neutral and do not require extra compensa-
tion for risks associated with real and nominal bond yields (Gurkaynak et al. 2010,
84). The consensus in the literature is that this is an unrealistic assumption and
that there will be some premia attached to the yields. As bond yields reflect the real
interest rate prevalent in the economy, a clear uncertainty relating to these yields
is interest rate risk, hence they are likely to incorporate some form of interest rate
risk premium. The assumption though is that this risk will affect nominal and real
yields in equal measure so it will not be present in the inflation compensation.
(Pflueger & Viceira 2011, 1)
The two risk premia that are commonly associated with the inflation compensa-
tion are inflation risk and liquidity risk premia. Inflation risk arises from the fact
that the inflation rate at the time of maturity is unknown and so it creates uncer-
tainty to the yield of the nominal bond and hence risk-averse investors will require
a higher yield as compensation for this uncertainty. The liquidity premium follows
from the poorer liquidity of the index-linked bonds compared with nominal gov-
ernment bonds due to the fact  that  the trading volume of  the former is  markedly
lower than that of the latter (Pflueger & Viceira 2011, 1-2)
If  we  were  to  assume  that  the  inflation  and  liquidity  premia  are  constant  over
time, their presence in the inflation compensation would not necessarily be a prob-
lem, as the changes to the compensation would then reflect directly changes to in-
flation expectations, which is the primary interest in this thesis (Jochmann et al.
2008, 3-4). However this too is not a reasonable assumption. The uncertainty
about future inflation is strongly affected by changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment and it is not very credible to think that inflation risk in the Euro Area was
the same say in 2004-2006 and 2009-2011.
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3.2.1 Test of random walk hypothesis of inflation compensation
The presence of the inflation and liquidity risk premia, or whether they are con-
stant over time, can be determined by looking at the volatility of the inflation com-
pensation and more specifically comparing short-term and long-term volatility to
determine whether inflation compensation is a random walk, as should be the case
under rational expectations. We again follow Gurkaynak et al. (2010, 84-85) and
look  at  the  five-year  and  five-year  minus  one  day  forward  rates  of  inflation  com-
pensation, denoted ??
?(5) and ???(5?) respectively. If inflation compensation fol-
lows a random walk, then ??(????? (? ?) ? ???(5) = 0 and ?? = ????? (? ?) ? ???(5) is
a martingale difference sequence.
This  can be tested using the variance ratio test  developed by Lo and MacKinlay
(1988) and following the presentation of Chen (2008, 98-99). The variance of dif-
ferences of ?? taken at multiple intervals should be linear across the data series. In
other words the variance of ?? ? ????  should be q times the variance of ?? ? ????.
This  is  tested by comparing 1/q times the variance of ?? ? ????  to  the variance of
?? ? ????. The Variance ratio is hence defined as:
??(?) = ??(?)
??(1) (3.11)
where ??(?) is 1/q times the variance of ?? ? ????  and ??(1) is the variance of ?? ?
????. The null hypothesis is that ??(?) = 1.
The equations for ??(?) and ??(1) follow from the definition of variance:
??(1) = 1
?? ? 1?(?? ? ???? ? ??)???
???
(3.12)
??(?) = 1
?
?(?? ? ???? ? ???)???
???
(3.13)
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where ??  is  the  average  of ?? across the whole sample and ? = ?(?? ? ? + 1)(1?
?
??
). The null hypothesis is tested by the standard normal test statistic under the
assumption of both homo- and heteroscedasticity. The test statistic is of the form:
?(?) = (??(?)? 1)
??(?) ~?(0,1) (3.14)
The definition of ?(?) depends on the assumption of homo- or heteroscedasticity
with:
?(?)?? = 2(2? ? 1)(? ? 1)3?(??) (3.15)
assuming homoscedasticity and:
?(?)?? =??2(? ? ?)
?
?
?
??(?)???
???
(3.16)
assuming heteroscedasticity, with:
??(?) = ? (?? ? ???? ? ??)?(???? ? ?????? ? ??)????????
?? (?? ? ???? ? ??)?????? ?? (3.17)
3.2.2 Extracting liquidity and inflation risk premia
The next  step in order to derive the true inflation expectations is  to decompose
the inflation compensation into the inflation and liquidity risk premia and infla-
tion expectations components. The liquidity premium arises from the fact that in-
flation-linked bonds are not as liquid as nominal bonds, hence investors require a
larger return as compensation. From this is follows that inflation-linked bonds
have a higher yield relative to nominal bonds and inflation compensation is less
than it  would be without the liquidity premium. Conversely,  inflation risk is  pre-
sent only in the nominal bonds again causing investors to require a higher yield
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and widening inflation compensation.  Combining these two effects  yields that  in-
flation compensation is decomposed into these elements as follows:
??
???? = ????? + ???? ? ???? (3.18)
Following Gurkaynak et al. (2010, 86-88), the liquidity risk premium can be ex-
tracted using the following OLS regression:
??
???? = ? + ??? + ?? (3.19)
where X is a vector containing proxies for the liquidity of index-linked bonds. The
fitted values of the regression represent the changes to inflation compensation due
to changes in the liquidity of the inflation-linked and nominal government bonds.
The proxies for liquidity can include the difference of the respective daily average
bid-ask spreads of the inflation-linked and nominal government bonds or the rela-
tive trading volume of the inflation-linked debt, as a percentage of all traded gov-
ernment debt of a particular country. These both measure the liquidity of the gov-
ernment bonds in the secondary markets. The bid-ask spread is the most common-
ly used measure of the liquidity of a financial asset as it incorporates both the di-
rect and indirect transaction costs of trading activity and it will be the measure
used in the analysis. (Sarr & Lybek 2002, 9)
The bid-ask spread S can be defined as the absolute difference of the bid price ??
and the ask price ?? at the end of a given trading day, or as a percentage of their
average:
? = ?? ? ??
?
?? + ??2 ? (3.20)
The advantage of  using the percentage of  the average price is  that  it  standardizes
the spread across high and low prices and across different markets and securities
allowing for robust comparisons. (Sarr & Lybek 2002, 10). The final measure of the
relative liquidity of the index-linked and nominal bonds used in the regression in
equation 3.19 is the difference of their respective average bid-ask spreads:
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?? = 1????,??????
???
?
1
?
???,?????
???
(3.21)
The remaining inflation risk premium can now be extracted, with the help of sur-
vey inflation expectations, using a state space model. This is a common way of es-
timating stochastic models with measurement errors, which is the case here, as we
will be combining the daily compensation series with discrete quarterly survey es-
timations (Jalles 2009, 18).
The liquidity-adjusted measure for inflation compensation should now only con-
tain the true inflation expectations and the inflation risk premium:
??
??? = ????? + ???? (3.22)
The survey expectations of inflation are considered to be an approximation of the
true expectations on the days that the survey is published (Gurkaynak et al. 2010,
88-89).  The  survey  to  be  used  in  the  analysis  is  the  Survey  of  Professional  Fore-
casters  (SPF),  which  produces  a  quarterly  forecast  for  inflation  published  on  the
ECB’s website.
These survey expectations can be expressed in the following way:
??
??? = ????? + ????? (3.23)
where ????? is an independently and identically distributed measurement error.
Equations (3.22) and (3.23) are the measurement equations and they are com-
bined to form a state space form representation, where the vector (???, ?????)’ is the
vector of the unobserved states. Again following from the rational expectations
hypothesis  we assume that  long-run inflation expectations follow a random walk.
We further assume that the inflation risk premium follows an AR(1) process. The
system of equations can then be written in the form:
?
??
???
???
??? = ?1?00? ? ??????????????? ? + ???????? (3.24)
31
where ???and ???are independently and identically distributed, mutually uncorre-
lated random variables, with mean zero and variances ??? and ??? respectively. ??? is
set to the data and the rest of the parameters are estimated using the Kalman filter.
As a result the true inflation expectations ??
???  can be produced. (Gurkaynak et al.
2010, 89-90)
 The Kalman filter  is  a  method introduced by Kalman (1960) as a  recursive solu-
tion to produce a linear filtering of noisy discrete data. It is in the form of an algo-
rithm consisting of a prediction for the new state of the model and a correction
component that minimizes the difference of that prediction and the actual new
state when it is confirmed. The filter assumes that the state vector and error terms
follow a normal distribution which allows for the estimation of the unknown pa-
rameters of the system to be estimated by maximum likelihood. (Jalles 2009, 18)
Following the presentation of Harvey and Shephard (1993, 267-270) an observed
multivariate time series ??  of ? elements is related to a ??× 1 state vector ??  by the
measurement equation:
?? = ???? + ?? (3.25)
where ?? is a non-stochastic ? × ? matrix, ?? is a ~?(0,??) distributed ? × 1 error
vector and ??  is a ?? × ? variance-covariance matrix. We note that equation (3.25)
corresponds to equations (3.22) and (3.23), with ?? ?= (????? ,?????)? and ?? =(?????,????)?. As ? and ? both  equal  2, ?? and ??  are 2 × 2 matrices  of  the  form
?
??? ???1 0 ? and ?0 0? ???? respectively.
In the state space model ?? is  allowed to change through time according to the
transition equation:
?? = ?????? + ?? (3.26)
where ?? is a non-stochastic ? × ? matrix, ??  is a ~?(0,??) distributed ? × 1 error
vector and ??  is a ? × ? variance-covariance matrix. Again we note that (3.26) cor-
responds to (3.24). ?? and ??  are 2?× 2 matrices  of  the  form ?1 00 ???? and
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?
??? 0
? ???
? respectively. All in all, depending on the specification of the variances
of the unobserved states in ??, the parameters to be estimated in the model are
???? ???? ??? ? ???? ??? ? ???.
To  begin  with,  some  assumptions  about  the  initial  state  of  the  model  must  be
made. We assume that ?? is distributed ?????? ??). Also ?? is  assumed to be un-
correlated with ??  and ??.  The Kalman filter provides the mean of the conditional
density of ?????, where ??  is the set of information up until time t {??, … ,??} and the
knowledge of the initial state ??.
Combining equations (3.25) and (3.26) and taking into account the above as-
sumptions yields the distributions for ??  and ??  and the three sets of equations
necessary to perfom the filter:
?
??
??
? |??~? ?? ??|???????|???? , ? ??|??? ??|??????????|??? ?? ???, (3.27)
where
??|??? = ??????, ??|??? = ????????? + ?? (3.28)
are the prediction equations and:
?? = ?? ? ????|???, ?? = ????|?????? + ?? (3.29)
are the one-step ahead forecast equations, where ?? is the one-step ahead forecast
error and ?? is its variance, hence ????(0,??). From the conditions placed on mul-
tivariate normal distributions we get:
??|??~?(?? ,??), (3.30)
where
?? = ??|??? + ??|???????????? , ?? = ??|??? ? ??|??????????????|??? (3.31)
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are the updating equations.
The filter is run so that some initial values are assumed for the unobserved varia-
bles and the rest of the parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood. One can
choose how closely the filter should follow either the observations or the predic-
tions, which is measured by the Kalman gain. With a high gain the filter places
more emphasis on the measurements and conversely a low gain more emphasis to
the model predictions. (Bishop & Welch 1997, 3)
3.3 Event study
The approximation for the inflation expectations extracted from the inflation com-
pensation of government bond yields can now be used to gauge the effectiveness of
monetary policy in affecting the expectations of future inflation. This is done in an
event study context, where the evolution of inflation expectations is looked at be-
fore and after an event, in this case relating to new information about ECB policy.
The first approximation of this effect is done simply by regressing the inflation
expectations extracted in section 3.2.2 on the key ECB policy rate:
??
??? = ?? + ?????? + ?? (3.32)
This will give some indication of the direction of correlation between expected in-
flation and monetary policy.
To gauge the longer-term effects of changes to the ECB’s rate we run a basic vec-
tor autoregression (VAR) model of the form:
?
??
???
??
???
? =??? ?????????????????? + ???????? (3.33)
The optimal lag length p will be determined by looking at the standard information
criteria.  The main objective is  to look at  how shocks manifesting through ???  and
???  affect the ECB rate and inflation expectations respectively over an extended
period of time.
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However the changes of the key ECB rate are not the only channel of monetary
policy, as for example the decision to keep rates unchanged can be a policy meas-
ure in the same way as changing the rate is.  This  effect  is  not  captured in the re-
gressions in (3.32) and (3.33). Hence it is necessary to look at a model containing
time dummies relating to the release of news about monetary policy conditions,
whether that is the changing the key rate, keeping it unchanged or merely inform-
ing about the future strategy of  the ECB. Announcements such as Mario Draghi’s
famous “anything it  takes to save the Euro” can have a much larger effect  on the
expectations of financial market participants than a rate change, which is usually
expected and hence does not necessarily have much of an impact when confirmed.
We run two time dummy regressions, one where the dummies relate to dates of
meetings of the ECB governing council when a change to the ECB’s rate were de-
cided, and the second for dates of announcements of unconventional monetary
policy measures by the ECB. The regressions are of the form:
???
??? = ? + ??? + ?? (3.34)
where ?? is the dummy variable with the value 1 for days of the governing council
meetings or unconventional monetary policy announcements and 0 for all other
days. The dependent variable in these regressions is the first difference of expecta-
tions, rather than the level, in order to see if there is a consistent change in expec-
tations on the day of the announcements.
The final section of the event study looks at what effect of the ECB’s expanded as-
set purchase programme has had so far on inflation expectations. This is done by
looking at the trend of expectations for a period before the announcement and af-
ter.  We  set  the  periods  to  approximately  6  months,  or  120  trading  days,  which
should be enough to establish the pre-event trend. The regressions are of the form:
??
??? = ? + ??? + ?? (3.35)
where ? is the trend for the pre- and post-event periods.
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4. Data
The main data used in the thesis is the prices and maturities of inflation-linked
bonds of Eurozone governments. For liquidity purposes the focus is on large Euro-
zone countries, whose debt is traded most frequently. The inflation-linked bond
market  is  a  comparatively  recent  development,  with  most  of  the  first  debt  issues
having taken place in the late 1990s. The first bonds indexed to the Euro area infla-
tion index, the HICPxT, were issued soon afterwards in the early 2000s.
The main idea of  an index-linked bond is  that  the principal  is  adjusted daily  to
the reference index so that at maturity investors retain their purchasing power.
The coupon payments are calculated from this index referenced principal, hence
investors’  income  from  holding  the  bond  is  also  protected  against  inflation.  The
principal payed at maturity cannot fall below the initial principal, hence index-
linked bonds further protect against deflation. (Tuckman & Serrat 2011, 7)
The data on the French government bonds, including the price and bid and ask
rates used for the liquidity premium extraction, are from Thomson Reuters
Datastream. All prices are mid rates of the closing quotes of each trading day. The
data on realized HICPxT inflation is from Eurostat and the Survey of Professional
Forecasters is from the ECB.
4.1 French government inflation-linked bonds
The  main  data  used  to  build  the  model  is  on  French  government  debt,  as  the
French government has as of October 2015 eight outstanding bonds indexed to the
HICPxT with two bonds already matured. Other possibilities could be the debt of
other  core  Euro  area  countries  such  as  Germany  and  Italy.  The  German  govern-
ment has issued only five bonds linked to the HICPxT however and the lower cred-
it rating of Italian bonds would mean that the implied credit risk would have to be
extracted during the analysis. Naturally the more outstanding bonds there are for a
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given  day,  the  better  the  fit  and  shape  of  the  yield  curve  for  that  day.  As  will  be
seen later on, nine bonds produce a remarkably accurate yield curve.
The French government issues two kinds of inflation-linked debt, based on
French and Euro area inflation. We use the latter of these, which is called OAT€i
(standing for Obligations Assimilables du Trésor € inflation). The first OAT€i was
issued in October 2001 and apart from the years 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2009
there has a been a new issue every year since. The characteristics of the individual
currently outstanding OAT€I issues are described in Table 1.
Note: Both the maturities and base index dates are the 25th July of each year. (AFT, 2014)
Table 1. Characteristics of outstanding OAT€i issues.
Maturity 2018 2020 2022 2024 2027 2030 2032 2040
Real
Coupon
0,25 % 2,25 % 1,10 % 0,25% 1,85% 0,70% 3,15 % 1,80%
Base in-
dex year
2011 2003 2009 2012 2010 2013 2002 2006
Figure 1. Issued OAT€i securities.
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To  further  demonstrate  the  range  of  maturities  available  for  the  analysis,  as  in
Gurkaynak et al. (2010), all the issues of OAT€i are shown graphically in Figure 1
including bonds that matured in 2012 and 2015. Each line corresponds to an indi-
vidual issue with the dates on the horizontal axis and years to maturity in years on
the vertical axis.
From this  graphical  representation it  is  quickly observed that  most  of  the bond
issues have taken place in more recent years. Again as the robustness of the yield
curve is the better the more individual securities there are available to form it, the
analysis  will  inevitably have to be focused on the last  couple of  years.  That is  not
necessarily a bad thing, as said before, the issue of very low medium term inflation
expectations in the Euro area has been most relevant during the last few years.
The OAT€is have a nominal  principal  of  100€ and pay a coupon that  is  a  fixed
percentage of the index-linked principal. The principal is linked to a daily refer-
ence that is calculated by linear interpolation for day j and month m using the fol-
lowing formula:
?????????? = ?????? + ?? ? 1??? ? (?????? ? ??????) (4.1)
Where IPC is the value of the HICPxT for months m-2 and m-3 respectively, nj is
the number of day j in month m and NJ is the total number of days in month m.
The indexation lag is due to the fact that the reference applicable for the principal
is  the HICPxT of  the third previous month to the month of  the payment.  For ex-
ample if the payment of the principal were to fall on June 1 the reference index
would be the HICPxT for March. For any other day the reference is the one given
by (4.1). The indexation lag is due to the fact that the value of the HICPxT for a giv-
en month is subject to possible revisions by Eurostat at the end of the subsequent
month.  (Agence France Tresor, 2015). Given that we eliminate bonds with maturi-
ties of less than two years, the indexation lag should not affect the results of the
analysis.
4.2 ECB policy announcements
The European Central Bank is the central bank that conducts monetary policy for
all 19 member states of the Euro area. The tasks of the European System of Central
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Banks (ESCB) and the Eurosystem are laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union. Article 127(1) of this treaty defines that the primary objec-
tive  of  the  Eurosystem  and  hence  the  ECB  "shall  be  to  maintain  price  stability".
(European Central Bank, 2011)
The main decision decision-making body of the ECB is the Governing Council
which consists of the six members of the ECB’s executive board and the governors
of  the 19 national  central  banks of  the Euro area.  In order to specify  its  objective
more precisely, the Governing Council announced the following quantitative defi-
nition in 1998: “Price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below 2%. Price
stability is to be maintained over the medium term”. Following a thorough evalua-
tion of its monetary policy strategy in 2003, the Governing Council further clari-
fied that, within the definition, it aims to maintain inflation rates “below, but close
to, 2% over the medium term”. (European Central Bank, 2011)
The Governing council meets twice every month, with decisions regarding mone-
tary  policy  taken  during  the  first  of  these  meetings  and  the  second  one  covering
other  tasks  and  responsibilities  of  the  ECB.  The  monetary  policy  decisions  made
every  six  weeks  are  explained  in  detail  at  a  press  conference  taking  place  at  the
same intervals. It is at these meetings that the Governing Council concludes its key
interest rate decisions. (European Central Bank, 2011)
There  are  three  main  policy  interest  rates  that  the  ECB  controls.  They  are  the
interest rate for the main refinancing operations (MRO), which provide the bulk of
liquidity to the banking system. Secondly the rate on the deposit facility, which
banks may use to make overnight deposits with the ECB. Third is the rate on the
marginal lending facility, which offers overnight credit to banks from the Euro
area. The evolution of the three rates from the inception of the monetary union in
1999 is presented in Figure 2. (European Central Bank, 2011)
As  the  MRO  constitute  most  of  the  refinancing  of  the  financial  sector  and  are
essential to the implementation of the ECB’s open market operations, it is the rate
that has the largest effect on the Euro area economy and is the one watched most
closely by financial  market  participants.  Hence it  will  be the one used in the first
regression  of  the  event  study  section.  Though  as  can  be  seen  from  the  graph,  all
three rates are usually changed at the same time and by the same magnitude, so
any one of the three would apply just as well.
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4.2.1 The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
As  both  the  inflation  protected  government  bonds  and  the  Governing  Council  of
the  ECB  refer  to  inflation  in  terms  of  the  Harmonised  Index  of  Consumer  Prices
for the euro area, it is worth saying something about the composition and compila-
tion of this index. First of all it is worth noting that the ECB’s price stability target
is  tied  to  the  full  index  (HICP),  whereas  the  reference  index  for  the  index-linked
French government bonds excludes tobacco (HICPxT). The latter index is the one
used for all Euro area inflation-linked financial products and has become the one
most looked at by market participants. As tobacco has a weight of only 2,4 % in the
HICP index, the difference in inflation rates between the indices is negligible.
The HICP index is compiled by Eurostat in collaboration with the individual na-
tional statistics institutes of the Eurozone countries. The ECB is also directly in-
volved  in  the  compilation  of  the  index,  given  its  use  in  monetary  policy.  Data  on
HICP inflation is available from 1995 onwards, with not entirely comparable back
data available from 1990. (European Central Bank, 2011)
The different Eurozone countries have different weights in the index correspond-
ing to population and the individual items have different weights depending on the
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Figure 2. The ECB's key policy rates.
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country. For the Euro area as a whole, goods make up 56,5 % and services 43,5 %
respectively of the index as of November 2015 . These are broken down into small-
er categories to identify the different economic factors that impact on consumer
price developments. Energy prices are strongly affected by the oil price for instance
and  foods  are  divided  into  processed  and  unprocessed  foods  given  that  weather
patterns have more of an impact on the latter. (European Central Bank, 2011)
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5. Estimation results
The empirical estimation is conducted by following the steps laid down in chapter
3.  Firstly  the continuous set  of  yields are obtained by fitting a yield curve for  the
individual bond prices of both the nominal and index-linked bonds for each trad-
ing day. The measure of inflation compensation is calculated as the difference be-
tween the yields of these bonds for each maturity. The inflation compensation is
then tested to see if it represents true inflation expectations, in other words if it
follows a random walk. In the event that compensation does not represent expecta-
tions, the remaining liquidity and inflation risk –premia are extracted. Finally the
hopefully now accurate measure of inflation expectations is regressed on the ECB
key interest rate and on time dummies for ECB policy announcements. The inter-
action  between  rate  and  expectations  is  further  looked  at  with  a  VAR  model  and
the chapter concludes with an appraisal of the effects of the EAPP.
5.1 Yield curve estimation
The first step of the empirical analysis is fitting a yield curve to the observed yields
of the French government bonds. This is done by utilizing the Nelson-Siegel-
Svensson yield curve expressed in equation (3.8). The actual minimization of (3.9)
is done by the Solver function in Excel. The only practical issue in calibrating the
curve is choosing the initial parameter values for ???, ??, ??, ??, ??and ??6. For most
of  the  sample  we  choose  initial  values  of ?? = 0,02, ??,?,? ? ?0,05 and ??,? = 2 as
they provide a smooth traditional yield curve shape. For some days, however, the
NSS  yield  curve  gives  quite  erratic  values  for  short  maturities,  especially  for  the
6 The Solver function uses a generalized reduced gradient algorithm for the optimization problem, which
comes with the drawback that the algorithm stops when it finds the closest minimum to the initial values,
which might not be the global optimum of the function (Frontline Solvers, 2015). This results in the squared
error between the observed and estimated yields being slightly larger if the algorithm finds only a locally
optimal solution. Given the already high accuracy of the method, this small loss of accuracy is worth accept-
ing since the algorithm is highly efficient, which given the large dataset is desirable.
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time period of late 2008 during the height of the financial crisis, when the prices of
the bonds were volatile and there were fewer outstanding bonds to use for the yield
curve fitting.  For these days the curve can be made to behave better  by choosing
slightly different individual initial parameter values. The average cumulative
squared error between the NSS model yields and the observed yields (equation
3.9) is approximately 1,3 × 10?? for the index-linked bonds and 1,1 × 10?? for the
nominal bonds, for the whole sample, so the accuracy of the model is very high.
Gurkaynak et al. (2010, 76) note that due to the indexation lag in inflation pro-
tected government bonds, the price movements of bonds with less than 18 months
to maturity can be large and subsequently they drop these bonds for their estima-
tion. Also, as discussed in section 2.2, the elimination of short-term maturities
from  the  curve  reduces  the  possibility  of  seasonal  fluctuations  distorting  the  re-
sults. Therefore, we chose not to include any bonds with less than two years to ma-
turity from the construction of the yield curves.
Figure 3 presents the French government index-linked yield curve for 13 Novem-
ber 2014. As can be seen, the NSS yield curve does a good job fitting the data, both
at short and long maturities, providing a traditional yield curve shape. The overall
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Figure 3. French government index-linked yield curve 13.11.2014
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low  level  of  yields  and  in  particular  the  negative  yields  for  the  shorter  maturities
arise from high prices of the bonds reflecting a strong demand for them following
extensive bond purchases by the ECB. The negative yields at short maturities also
correspond to the general low level of interest rates. Naturally the level of yield for
these bonds are lower than those on nominal bonds, as seen from Figure 4, due to
inflation being eliminated from the index-linked bonds by construction.
In Figure 4 are the respective yield curves for the nominal and index-linked
French government bonds on 13.11.2014. The inflation compensation is defined as
the  difference  between  the  two  yields,  in  the  figure  it  is  the  vertical  distance  be-
tween the two curves. As can be seen the two curves have roughly the same shape,
with the amount of compensation required by investors smaller at short maturities
and growing towards longer maturities reflecting the greater uncertainty in the
longer run level of inflation.
From these two curves the measure of inflation compensation for specific maturi-
ties, for example 5, 10 or 15-years, can now be calculated for the whole sample pe-
riod.  Initially  at  least  this  period  is  chosen  to  begin  from  the  issue  of  the  1,80  %
OAT€i maturing in 2040, which provides at least five bonds for both the nominal
Figure 4. Inflation compensation on 13.11.2014
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and real  yield curve estimations on any given day.  Hence the time period for the
analysis runs from 14.3.2007 – 18.8.2015. This is convenient for a robust analysis
as it contains a brief period of time before the financial crisis, the crisis period it-
self and the post crisis period. As this study focuses on the Euro area of particular
interest are the sovereign debt crises of the early 2010s, which naturally are also
contained in the sample period.
5.2 Inflation expectations
The measure of inflation compensation obtained from the yield curves is presented
in Figure 5. The compensation is calculated for maturities of 5, 10 and 15-years
giving an estimate for the expected level of inflation at those points of time in the
future. We will use the five-year ahead compensation for the analysis, as it is con-
sistent with the longest forecast given by the Survey of Professional forecasters.
Several observations can already be made from this measure of inflation expecta-
tions, mainly concerning the relative magnitudes of the different maturities assum-
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Figure 5. Euro area inflation compensation 14.3.2007-18.8.2015
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ing that the possible liquidity and inflation risk premia have an equal effect on all
of them. Of particular interest are the developments for the period 2007-2009 as
the data for the liquidity adjustment used later on is restricted to August 2009 and
so  this  figure  will  give  some  indication  of  what  happened  to  expectations  before
that date.
Firstly the compensation for the three maturities was remarkably converged dur-
ing the period before the global financial crisis began in earnest in the autumn of
2008. This is a period that might be characterized as “normal times”. Secondly, the
crisis caused a clear collapse in the compensation for all time horizons, but after-
wards the outlook for shorter-term inflation compensation began to disperse com-
pared  to  the  longer-term.  This  would  seem  to  point  to  the  growing  deflationary
fears at least for the shorter-term and overall uncertainty about the future path of
inflation. Also looking at this figure, given the strong variation of even the 15-year
ahead compensation, it would seem that Euro area inflation expectations are poor-
ly anchored. This is however too early to judge at this point, as much of the varia-
tion can be due to the liquidity and inflation risk premia.
Thirdly, probably the most significant event during the sample period from a
monetary policy perspective was the announcement of the ECB’s quantitative eas-
ing programme in early 2015. The effect of the announcement can be seen as a
clear bump in the inflation compensation, but interestingly it seems to have only
had a temporary effect, with the compensation falling with uncertainty over Greek
debt arrangements during the summer of  2015.  We will  analyse the effects  of  the
asset purchase program in more detail in the event study in section 5.3.
A final note is that there is a clear outlier in the data on the date of 23.4.2012 for
the prices of the nominal bonds causing an extreme deviation in the inflation com-
pensation.  This  date  is  also  an  outlier  in  the  data  on  liquidity  used  later  on.  The
observation corresponds to the French presidential elections that took place on the
previous day. As the elections have no direct consequence on Euro area inflation
expectations or the monetary policy of the ECB we will omit this observation from
the analysis as it would otherwise cause some distortions to the results.
5.2.1 Variance ratio test
This measure of inflation compensation equals inflation expectations only if in-
vestors are risk neutral. If this is the case, then under the rational expectations hy-
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pothesis inflation compensation should follow a random walk as discussed in sec-
tion 2.2. To test this we run the Lo-Mackinlay variance ratio test described in sec-
tion  3.2.1,  by  looking  at  whether  the  variance  of  inflation  compensation  over  a
longer period is proportionally larger than the daily changes to it.
Following Gurkaynak et al. (2010, 84-85) we calculate the five-year and five-
year-less-one-day measures of inflation compensation from the yield curves as-
suming  260  business  days  a  year.  To  look  if  the  expectation  of  inflation  in  five-
years today is the same as it will be tomorrow, as should be the case by the law of
iterated expectations, we define ?? = ????? (? ?) ? ???(5), where ? ? denotes five-
years-less-one-day. The task is now to compare whether the variance of ?? is pro-
portional to the cumulative variance of ?? over a period of one, three and six
months.  In  other  words  if  the  variance  of ? ????????  is  k  times  the  variance  of ??,
with k equal to 22, 66 and 132 assuming 22 business days in a month.
Standard deviation Variance ratio Test statistic P-value
1 day 0,04 %
1 month 0,21 % 0,050 -3,99 0,000
3 month 0,33 % 0,019 -2,59 0,001
6 month 0,75 % 0,010 -2,03 0,042
Notes: The null hypothesis is VR = 1. The variance ratio test statistic is assumed to have a standard normal
asymptotic distribution and it is computed allowing for time-varying conditional heteroscedasticity.
The results of the variance ratio test are presented in Table 2. The variance ratio
is calculated using the expression in equation (3.11). The test statistics used in the
table are heteroscedasticity robust, as expressed in equations (3.16) and (3.17). As
can be seen the variance ratios of the respective months are significantly different
from 1 at  the at  the 1  % level  for  k equal  to 22 and 66,  and at  the 5 % level  for  k
equal to 132. From this we can draw the fairly robust conclusion that inflation
compensation does not follow a random walk. More precisely it seems that the dai-
ly changes of inflation are too large compared to longer-term variation, given that
Table 2. Variance ratio test of the random walk hypothesis of the inflation compensa-
tion.
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the test statistics are negative. We also run the variance ratio test using the homo-
scedasticity consistent test statistics (equation 3.15). In that case all the variance
ratios are significantly  different from 1 at  the 1  % level,  which would support  the
rejection of the null hypothesis, although the assumption of heteroscedasticity
seems clear from a graphic analysis of ??.
5.2.2 Liquidity premium
Now that we have confirmed the likely existence of the liquidity and inflation risk
premia in the inflation compensation, we can go about trying to extract them to
produce the true measure of expectations. Firstly the liquidity effect on inflation
compensation is gauged as presented in section 3.2.2.
The results of the regression in equation (3.19) are presented in Table 3. As can
be seen the changes in the difference of the liquidity of the inflation-linked and
nominal bonds, as measured by their respective average bid-ask spreads, has a
negative effect on the inflation compensation that is statistically significant at the 5
% level. In other words when the spread difference grows, the compensation nar-
rows, which is consistent with the idea of a liquidity premium. However it is worth
noting that the changes in liquidity explain only a very small amount of the overall
variation of inflation compensation.
Regressor 5-year inflation compensation
Bid-ask spread
-0,108**
(0,048)
 Intercept 0,0144
R2 0,0024
Notes: The heteroscedasticity robust standard error is in parentheses. The number of observations is 1 612. **
Significant at the 5 % level.
In fact if we correct for possible autocorrelation in the regression errors by using
Newey-West  error  terms  for  lags  greater  than  one,  the  coefficient  for  the  bid-ask
spread becomes insignificant. Hence, it is possible that the liquidity premium is
Table 3. Regression of liquidity premium in inflation compensation
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not an issue for the French government inflation-linked bonds. Looking at the re-
spective bid-ask spreads, the spread for the inflation-linked bonds is consistently
higher  compared  to  the  nominal  spread,  so  we  will  proceed  with  adjusting  the
compensation to liquidity effects. In any case, the changes to the inflation compen-
sation caused by adjusting for liquidity are fairly cosmetic.
The fitted values of the regression represent the effect of liquidity on five-year in-
flation compensation, but do not give the level of the liquidity premium. Following
Gurkaynak et al. (2010, 88) we normalize the fitted value to zero at its lowest point
in time,  which is  on 20 September 2011,  giving an approximation for the level  of
the liquidity premium, relative to that point in time.
The estimated liquidity premium is expressed in terms of the yield compensation
in Figure 6. The sign of the liquidity premium is changed from the negative of the
regression  to  positive  in  order  to  show  the  extra  yield  demanded  by  investors  to
hold the inflation-linked bonds. This presentation confirms the low impact of the
liquidity;  for  most  of  sample period,  liquidity only adds approximately 5-10 basis
points to the yield of the inflation-linked French government bonds.
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Figure 6. Estimated liquidity premium of French government 5-year index-linked
bonds
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Overall,  the liquidity premium has been fairly  steady during the sample period,
with some spikes. Of interest is again the effect of the ECB’s asset purchase pro-
gramme at the end of the sample. Reflecting the initial effect on the compensation,
the initiation of the programme of buying sovereign bonds looks to have added to
the relative liquidity of the inflation-linked bonds, before the effect is reversed dur-
ing the summer of 2015.
5.2.3 Inflation risk premium
From  equation  3.18  it  follows  that  the  measure  for  the  adjusted  inflation  com-
pensation that contains only the true expectation and the inflation risk premium is
the sum of the inflation compensation and the liquidity premium: ??
??? = ?????? +
??
??.  This  is  the measure that  is  then used in equation (3.22).  Using this  adjusted
inflation compensation and the point estimate for future inflation provided by the
Survey of Professional Forecasters, we can now estimate the state-space model
described in section 3.2.2.
The SPF forecasts are made only on a quarterly basis, and as the data on liquidity
is  only  from  2009  onwards,  these  combine  to  make  the  estimation  of  the  model
decidedly tricky. We can either use the adjusted compensation and impose re-
strictions  on  the  covariance  structure  of  the  model,  or  assume  that  the  liquidity
premium is insignificant and use the original measure of inflation compensation
from March 2007 onwards without any restrictions on the covariance matrix.
 Beginning with the liquidity-adjusted compensation, the model to be estimated
is  described in equations (3.22) – (3.24).  The coefficient  of  the inflation expecta-
tions  on  lagged  expectations  in  equation  (3.24)  is  constrained  to  1  as  per  the  as-
sumption that  it  follows a random walk.  The coefficient  on expectations in equa-
tion (3.23) is likewise constrained to 1 following from survey expectations being a
noisy measure of true expectations. To be able to estimate the model using only the
24 survey observations the variance-covariance matrix Q in equation (3.26) is con-
strained to an identity matrix, leaving only four parameters to be estimated,
??? , ??? ? ???, ???  as described in equations (3.25) and (3.26).
The estimation of the model using the unadjusted compensation follows an oth-
erwise identical procedure, except that no structure is imposed on Q and the vari-
ance of the error term of the inflation expectations in equation (3.24) is set to the
variance of actual HICPxT inflation. This latter procedure is done by fitting an un-
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observed components model to the HICPxT data in the spirit of Stock and Watson
(2007,  16),  who add stochastic  volatility  to the model  and find it  to provide good
forecasts for inflation. For simplicity we omit the stochastic volatility and estimate
the variance of inflation with the basic random walk model:
??
???? = ???????? + ?? (5.1)
From this we get that the variance of ?? is approximately 0,05. The element ??? in
matrix Q in equation (3.26) is then constrained to this value when estimating the
state-space model.
Though  in  theory  the  state-space  model  is  able  to  work  with  missing  observa-
tions, it would seem that the amount of missing data in the quarterly survey expec-
tations,  if  they  are  treated  as  daily  observations,  is  too  much  for  an  algorithm  to
estimate the unobserved state variables. This means that we are only able to run
the state-space model for the quarterly data and hence the true expectations and
risk premium are estimated only at a quarterly frequency, which severely limits the
usefulness of the analysis. This problem could possibly be overcome by using a
longer sample period or with the addition of another set of observed survey expec-
tations. Unfortunately, neither of these measures was possible for this study.
The addition of  another measure of  survey expectations would be welcome also
to compensate for  the fact  that  the Survey of  Professional  Forecasters,  conducted
by the ECB, gives a very static measure of long-term expectations, which closely
follows the ECB’s own target of inflation of less than but close to 2 %. The level of
the  true  expectations  is  identified  by  the  survey  expectations,  given  that  they  are
assumed  to  represent  a  noisy  measure  of  the  true  expectations.  This  means  that
the true expectations estimated from the model are very flat around that 2 % mark
for the whole sample period. It then comes down to which measure is given more
credibility; the market derived inflation compensation or the survey expectations.
Given the communication of the ECB referring to historically low inflation expecta-
tions and the fairly drastic measures it has taken in order to raise expectations, it
seems likely that the compensation, which as seen from Figure 5 dipped below the
0,5 % mark in late 2014,  is  closer to reality.  True we are dealing with the longer-
term 5-year ahead expected level of inflation, but even that measure should exhibit
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a clear deviation from the 2 % level  to warrant the extensive asset  purchase pro-
grammes.
Figure 7 depicts the final estimated inflation expectations derived from both the
liquidity-adjusted and non-adjusted measures of the 5-year inflation compensa-
tion. As can be seen the two measures follow each other closely, with the liquidity-
adjusted expectations having a slightly higher volatility. This is another indication
of the limitations placed on the state-space model by the lack of observations, as
adjusting for the liquidity premium should in fact decrease the volatility of expec-
tations.  The fact  that  the two measures follow each other closely allows us to use
them interchangeably, which enables the use of the longer time series of the non-
adjusted compensation in the later analysis.
When extracting the risk premium it turns out that fixing the variance of inflation
expectations to the variance of actual HICPxT inflation is not the best specification
owing again to the limitations of the data. When the variance of expectations is
fixed to 0,05 the estimated variance of the risk premium is 0,42, which is unrealis-
tically high. Furthermore, the sign of the coefficient on the risk premium is nega-
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Figure 7. Estimated 5-year inflation expectations from liquidity-adjusted and non-
adjusted inflation compensation.
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tive, which is against the assumption that a rise in the risk premium increases in-
flation compensation (equation 3.22).
We therefore run the state-space model again using the non-adjusted compensa-
tion and impose no restrictions on the variances in the model. This means that ???
and ??? in equation (3.26) are both estimated in the model. The resulting decom-
position of the compensation into the expectations and risk premium is presented
in Figure 8. As can be seen, most of the volatility of the compensation is captured
in the risk premium, which is  due to the very low volatility  of  the SPF survey ex-
pectations to which the estimated expectations are linked.
This also mainly explains why the risk premium is negative for the latter part of
the sample. It is also possible however, that if the true expectations are as an-
chored  as  the  survey  forecasts  suggest,  the  negative  risk  premium  would  be  con-
sistent with the growing deflationary fears of the past few years. Again though,
both measures of the true inflation expectations and inflation risk premium, ex-
tracted in this way, are so crude that we should avoid drawing too many meaning-
ful conclusions from them.
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Figure 8. Decomposition of 5-year inflation compensation into inflation expectations and inflation
risk premium.
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5.3 Event study
We now turn our attention to the interaction of Euro area inflation expectations
and the monetary policy conducted by the ECB. To begin with, we look at the effect
of changes to the ECB’s key rates on expectations by simply regressing the inflation
expectations on the ECB’s main refinancing operations rate, as described in equa-
tion  3.32.  We  consider  also  adding  the  first  lag  of  the  rate  as  a  regressor,  taking
into account the fact that the rate change might take effect after trading has been
completed and hence be reflected in the bond prices of the next day.
As we were able to derive the true expectations only for a quarterly basis, we can-
not use them in the event study analysis. We hence turn back to the daily time se-
ries of the 5-year inflation compensation and run the regression for both the li-
quidity-adjusted compensation and non-adjusted compensation. The adjusted se-
ries runs only from August 2009 and contains more of the European sovereign
debt crisis time period, whereas the non-adjusted series contains the rapid lower-
ing of the ECB’s rate from around 4 % to 1 % during the second half of 2008.
ECB Main Refinancing
Operations Rate
Non-adjusted
Compensation
Adjusted
Compensation
t 1,148**
(0,31)
1,154**
(0,36)
t-1 -0,886**
(0,32)
-0,634*
(0,36)
Intercept 0,012 0,012
R2 0,60 0,56
Notes: Newey-West standard errors with maximum lag of 10 are in parentheses. The number of observations
are 2 231 and 1 611 for the non-adjusted and adjusted series respectively. ** Significant at the 5 % level. *
Significant at the 10 % level.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4. As can be seen, all the co-
efficients are significant and the explanatory power of the model is high. The fact
that the coefficient of the first lag of the ECB’s rate is negative would support the
Table 4. Regressions of liquidity-adjusted and non-adjusted 5-year inflation compen-
sation on the ECB’s main refinancing operations rate.
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conclusion that the effect of a rate change is observed by the markets on the next
trading day, given that convention suggests that a loosening in monetary policy
leads to higher expectations of inflation. The larger, more significant and positive
effect  of  the  same  period  ECB  rate  on  inflation  compensation  might  point  to  the
fact  that,  if  we  assume  the  effect  is  felt  on  the  next  trading  day,  a  rate  change  is
most likely a response to either too low or too high inflation or inflation expecta-
tions. If this is the case we would expect to see past values of inflation expectations
have a positive correlation with the ECB’s rate and conversely (if monetary policy
is effective) the future values of expectations having a negative correlation, which
is consistent with the results7.
To look at a more dynamic relationship between expectations and the ECB rate,
we run the VAR model described in equation (3.33). The model is run for both the
liquidity-adjusted and non-adjusted series, with the results being very similar.
Hence,  for  simplicity  we  present  only  the  results  of  the  non-adjusted  compensa-
tion. The lag length is specified as p = 2, which is the optimum given by each of the
final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwatrz’s
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan-Quinn information criteri-
on (HQIC).
The ordering of the variables follows naturally from the setup of looking at the ef-
fects of changes in monetary policy on expectations, hence the assumed direction
of causality runs from the ECB rate to expectations. We note that empirically there
is no clear direction of causality given by either the Granger causality test or cor-
rolellograms. Again this is most likely due to rate changes being a response to ex-
pectations and expectations in turn responding to rate changes.
The results of the VAR model are presented in the impulse response functions in
Figure 9. The graphs of interest are the effect of a shock in the expectations on the
ECB rate (top-right hand corner) and the effect of a shock in the ECB rate on ex-
pectations (bottom-left hand corner). The impulse responses seem to support the
hypothesis that a negative shock in inflation expectations leads to a lowering in the
ECB’s main refinancing operations rate and conversely, a negative shock in the
rate (i.e. monetary easing) causes initially an increase in expectations that levels
7 The fact that past values of expectations correlate positively with present values of the rate is further
confirmed by regressing compensation on the first forward of the ECB rate. The coefficients are positive and
significant at the 1 % level for both the adjusted and non-adjusted series.
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out through time. It has to be noted however that the latter effect is very small, just
about significant at the 5 % level and not persistent.
Moreover, the results should be tempered be the fact that, as with all macroeco-
nomic  variables,  there  are  so  many  forces  affecting  each  other  at  the  same  time
that drawing any kind of causal link between phenomena is practically impossible.
This  is  especially  the case with regressions as simple as the ones presented here.
The  robustness  of  the  models  could  be  improved  for  example  by  adding  surprise
components of announcements of changes to other macroeconomic variables, but
this is beyond the scope of this study.
Another issue is the identification of the timing of the rate change, or more pre-
cisely, the timing of the release of information on the rate change. As mentioned in
section 4.2, the monetary policy decisions of the ECB are made at the meetings of
the Governing Council, and published during a press conference on the same day.
The announcement of the rate change precedes the implementation by about a
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Figure 9. Impulse responses of shocks to inflation expectations and the ECB's key rate.
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week, for example the last change to the rate, a cut of 10 basis points, was an-
nounced on 4 September 2014, but not put into effect until 10 September 2014.
According to conventional notions, efficient markets will absorb the information as
soon  as  it  is  made  public,  hence  the  effect  on  expectations  should  occur  straight
after the announcement.
 Furthermore, a decision to not change rates can be as impactful as a decision to
change  them  depending  on  what  the  expectations  of  the  ECB’s  actions  are.  The
ECB can also inform of other monetary policy measures besides rate changes dur-
ing these meetings, which can likewise have an impact on inflation expectations.
Neither of these effects is captured in the regressions using the physical rate
changes.
In order to take these effects into account, we regress the change of expectations
against  a  dummy variable containing the dates of  the monetary policy announce-
ments as presented in equation (3.34). The dummy variable is 1 for the days of the
announcements,  again we will  look at  both the day of  the announcement and the
next trading day after it, and 0 for all other days. Since the governing council meets
approximately once a month to decide on the key interest rate decisions, including
every meeting date in the regression will likely not produce any meaningful results.
Instead, we first include only the dates of the meetings when the rate was changed
to complement the previous regression and VAR. The regression is run for both the
liquidity-adjusted and non-adjusted series.
We then look at specific dates when the ECB announced significant non-standard
monetary policy measures to counter the challenging economic environment of the
sample period. These measures are detailed in Table 5. As before, we use a dummy
for both the date of the announcement and the next trading day
Date Measure announced
4.6.2009 Covered bond purchase programme (CBPP)
10.5.2010
Measures to address severe tensions in financial markets, in-
cluding securities markets programme and long-term refinanc-
ing operations (LTRO)
Table 5. Dates  of  non-standard  monetary  policy  measures  conducted  by  the  ECB
2009-2015.
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6.10.2011 New covered bond purchase programme (CBPP2)
8.12.2011 Measures to support bank lending and money market activity
26.7.2012
Mario Draghi: “Within its mandate, the ECB will do whatever
it takes to preserve the Euro”
6.9.2012 Outright monetary transactions (OMT)
4.7.2013
Forward  guidance:  ECB  expects  key  rates  to  remain  at  cur-
rent or lower levels for an extended period of time
5.6.2014
Measures to enhance the functioning of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, including targeted longer-term refi-
nancing operations (TLTRO) and negative deposit rates
4.9.2014
Asset-backed purchase programme (ABSPP) and new covered
bond purchase programme (CBPP3)
22.1.2015 Extended asset purchase programme (EAPP)
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 6. The regressions A) and B)
are  run  separately.  On  the  whole  it  seems  that  announcements  of  the  changes  to
the ECB rate have no effect on expectations. Half of the rate changes occurred be-
fore the beginning of the adjusted series, hence the significant coefficient on the
next trading day after the announcement for that series is most likely a coincidence
due to a lack of observations.
The ineffectiveness of the announcements is most likely explained by the fact that
the rate changes are well anticipated even before the announcement. This could be
verified by regressing the compensation on a surprise component, in other words
comparing the consensus ex ante view of the rate change to the ex post outcome.
Winkleman et al. (2014) for example look at simultaneous movements in intraday
interest rates to identify surprises in the ECB’s monetary policy announcements.
They find that on the whole ECB policy decisions are well anticipated with few sig-
nificant surprises in the announcements, which would seem to be in line with the
results of regression A).
The coefficients in regression B) on the other hand are more significant for the
day  of  the  announcement,  so  it  looks  like  the  non-standard  monetary  policy
measures have more of a direct effect on expectations. It seems intuitive that non-
standard measures would be harder to anticipate than rate changes given their un-
orthodox  nature.  The  positive  sign  on  the  change  to  both  the  adjusted  and  non-
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adjusted  series  is  in  line  with  the  purpose  of  the  non-standard  measures  to  raise
expectations when they are low. The fact that the day after the announcement has
no effect on expectations indicates that the most of the immediate effect of the
measures is instantly priced into the government bonds.
Notes: Regressions of the non-adjusted 5-year inflation compensation on dummies for the dates of ECB key
rate change announcements (A) and ECB non-standard monetary policy measure announcements (B). Heter-
oscedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations is 2 233 and 1 610 for the
non-adjusted and adjusted series respectively. *** Significant at the 1 % level. ** Significant at the 5 % level.
One  possibility  not  accounted  for  in  the  various  models  run  so  far  is  that  the
monetary policy measures, both standard and non-standard, might not have an
instantaneous  effect,  but  might  work  their  way  into  expectations  more  gradually.
This  could  be  the  case  if  the  French  government  bond  markets  are  not  fully  effi-
cient meaning that information takes time to be included in the prises. To answer
this question we look at the effects of the announcements on the non-adjusted
compensation graphically, as presented in Figure 10.
Again,  it  should be remembered that  with macroeconomic variables looking for
natural experiments and “treatment effects” is next to impossible given the multi-
Table 6. Regressions of changes to inflation compensation on time dummies of ECB
monetary policy announcements.
Regressor ?Non-adjusted Compensation ?Adjusted Compensation
A) Date of rate change
t -0,00001
(0,0002)
0,00004
(0,00008)
t+1 -0,00010
(0,0002)
-0,00314**
(0,0015)
R2 0,0002 0,0029
B) Date of non-standard
measure
t 0,00040**
(0,0002)
0,00056***
(0,0002)
t+1 0,00010
(0,0002)
-0,0001
(0,0001)
R2 0,0022 0,0095
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tude of variables affecting each other simultaneously. The graphs should therefore
not be taken at face value. Even so, there are no clear universal effects after either
rate change, or policy announcements. There are a few instances where a trough in
the compensation is coupled with a monetary policy measure, but others when the
post-announcement trend is steeply downwards or flat. It should be noted that the
last rate change of 2009 and the first change of 2011 are actually rate hikes, both of
which are roughly followed by a drop in compensation, as would be expected.
5.3.1 Expanded asset purchase programme (EAPP)
To conclude the section on empirical analysis we look at the most significant sin-
gle monetary policy measure conducted by the ECB during the period of interest.
On 22 January 2015, the ECB announced the initiation of an expanded asset pur-
chase programme involving purchases of bonds issued by the Euro area central
governments, agencies and European institutions in secondary markets. The pro-
gramme is intended to run at least until September 2016 with monthly purchases
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Figure 10. Dates of announcements  of  changes  to  the  ECB  rate  (upper  panel)  and  of  ECB  non-
standard monetary policy measures (lower panel).
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totalling 60 billion Euros. The programme has been likened to similar asset pur-
chase  programmes  run  by  the  Federal  Reserve,  Bank  of  Japan  and  Bank  of  Eng-
land, generally dubbed quantitative easing (QE). (European Parliament 2015)
The main objective of  the programme is  to help the ECB fulfil  its  price stability
mandate, more specifically bringing inflation back to the ECB’s target of less than
but  close  to  2  %.  In  the  press  conference  of  the  announcement,  the  ECB’s  chair-
man, Mario Draghi, when discussing the motivation behind the programme, re-
marked that: “this assessment is underpinned by a further fall in market-based
measures of inflation expectations over all horizons, and the fact that most indica-
tors of actual or expected inflation stand at, or close to, their historical lows” (Eu-
ropean Central Bank 2015a). Our market based measure of expectations backs up
this  claim as the lowest  value of  the non-adjusted compensation in our sample is
on 6 January 2015. Hence, given that targeting inflation expectations is a specific
goal of the EAPP, it will be interesting to look at its effect so far.
   We  do  this  simply  by  comparing  the  pre-announcement  and  post-
announcement trends, both by regressing inflation expectations on time, and
graphically.  A  more  precise  method  to  correctly  identify  the  specific  effect  of  the
announcement would be to use high frequency intraday data for the day of the an-
nouncement, but again this data was not available to us.
Newey-West standard errors with maximum lag of 10 are in parentheses. Number of observations is 121. ***
Significant at the 1 % level.
Table 7. Regressions of the liquidity-adjusted 5-year inflation compensation on a 120-
day pre-announcement and post announcement period.
Regressor Liquidity-adjusted compensation
Trend in 7.8.2014 - 21.1.2015 -0,00003***
(8,70e-06)
Intercept 0,667
R2 0,55
Trend in 22.1.2015 - 9.7.2015 0,00003***
(7,77e-06)
Intercept -0,616
R2 0,53
61
The  results  of  the  regression  are  shown  in  Table  7.  The  pre-  and  post-
announcement periods are set at 120 trading days running from 7 August 2014 to
21  January  2015  and  22  January  2015  to  9  July  2015  respectively.  The  liquidity-
adjusted inflation compensation is chosen as the dependent variable as we are not
interested  in  the  period  prior  to  August  2009.  As  can  be  seen,  the  pre-
announcement trend is almost perfectly reversed after the announcement, with the
coefficient of the same magnitude, but with the sign reversed to positive.
The same effect can be seen from the graphical representation in Figure 11. Here
the post announcement period is extended to the end of the sample to look at the
situation at the time of writing. The announcement of the EAPP coincides with a
trend reversal in inflation expectations, though they had begun to rise already be-
fore the announcement, most likely in anticipation of a significant measure by the
ECB. There is also a clear jump in expectations on the exact day of the announce-
ment.
However, as mentioned earlier, expectations fall back down close the pre-
announcement level after a summer containing uncertainties about Greek debt
repayment and the growth of the Chinese economy. Expectations begin to pick up
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Figure 11. Trends of liquidity-adjusted 5-year inflation compensation before and
after announcement of the EAPP on 22 January 2015.
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once  more  at  the  start  of  autumn  and  it  will  be  interesting  to  see  if  they  reach  a
permanently higher level in the near future.
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6. Conclusions
This thesis has looked at the estimation of market-based measures of Euro area
inflation expectations and the interaction of those expectations with the monetary
policy conducted by the ECB for the period of 2007-2015. The method used in the
analysis was the measure of inflation compensation, calculated as the difference
between nominal and real yield curves extracted from French government bond
prices. We find that there appears to be time-varying liquidity and inflation risk
premia in the inflation compensation, meaning that it is not a pure measure of in-
flation expectations. We go about extracting the premia using proxies for liquidity
and  a  state-space  model,  though  due  to  the  limits  of  available  data,  we  are  only
able to produce the true inflation expectations at a quarterly frequency.
The evolution of inflation expectations as measured by inflation compensation is
volatile during the sample period. There was a sharp fall in expectations during the
height  of  the  global  financial  crisis  in  2008  followed  by  a  rebound  back  to  the
ECB’s target of close to 2 %. Expectations began to fall again during 2013 and
reached the low point of the sample in January 2015. The quantitative easing pro-
gramme initiated also in January 2015 raised expectations for a while, until a vola-
tile summer brought them back down. Expectations have been rising again during
the autumn of 2015.
Judging by the volatility of the long-run compensation series of 10- and 15-year
ahead inflation, inflation expectations are weakly anchored. We note also that li-
quidity seems to account for only a small amount of the variation in the compensa-
tion of French government bonds, hence the liquidity-adjusted compensation fol-
lows closely the path of the non-adjusted series with only the level slightly higher.
We use the daily compensation series to analyse the effectiveness of the ECB’s
monetary policy with a series of regressions, which constitute an event study. We
find a positive correlation between past expectations and the current ECB key rate
and a negative correlation between the past rate and current expectations, con-
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sistent with the notion that expansive monetary policy is conducted to raise expec-
tations when they are low, and that expectations subsequently pick up as a result.
We find no relationship between the announcements of rate changes and expecta-
tions,  pointing  to  the  conclusion  that  ECB  rate  changes  are  well  anticipated.  An-
nouncements of non-standard monetary policy measures are less anticipated and
they seem to succeed in raising expectations, at least initially. Finally the quantita-
tive easing programme initiated by the ECB in January 2015 lifted expectations for
a while, but its long-run effects are yet unknown.
These  findings  would  seem  quite  encouraging  from  the  perspective  of  a  central
bank’s monetary policy. The fact that the rate change announcements are well an-
ticipated indicates that the ECB’s communication is consistent and predictable,
meaning that  it  has credibility  among financial  markets  participants.  The success
of the non-standard measures in affecting a positive change in expectations is a
good complement to the predictability of rates, especially since the latter have
ceased to be a policy measure now that  we are at  the zero lower bound.  This  en-
sures that the ECB’s monetary policy can still be effective even in this kind of envi-
ronment. Whether the measures can help affect a permanent rise in expectations
remains to be seen. This is especially true of the effectiveness of the expanded asset
purchase programme (EAPP).
The limitations of the thesis concern mainly the availability and quality of the da-
ta  used  in  the  analysis.  Due  to  the  relatively  low  number  of  government  bonds
linked to Euro area inflation, the beginning of the sample period is constricted to a
point in time when there were enough outstanding bonds from which to construct
the  yield  curves.  This  means  that  most  of  the  sample  contains  times  of  severe  fi-
nancial markets turbulence, which makes the comparison to normal times impos-
sible,  and might cause fluctuations in the inflation compensation that  are not  re-
lated to changes in expectations.
Particularly problematic is the survey measure of inflation expectations, the Sur-
vey of Professional Forecasters, used to identify the true expectations, both in fre-
quency and variation. It seems unlikely that true Euro area inflation expectations
are as well anchored as the survey seems to suggest, given the communication and
measures of the ECB. These problems could have possibly been overcome with the
use of another survey series, which unfortunately was not available. The inclusion
of high frequency intraday data on the movements of bond prices would help bet-
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ter identify the impact of monetary policy announcements. Adding surprise com-
ponents of macroeconomic news announcements would also make the results of
the regressions more robust.
A  longer  sample  of  both  bonds  and  surveys  will  produce  more  robust  results,
hence future studies using the same methodology can be more informative. In ad-
dition, the further development of financial assets and derivatives linked to infla-
tion will give researchers a richer source of data to directly measure market-based
expectations, including an accurate gauge of the uncertainty of expectations, as
well as a point estimate. The effects of the EAPP can also be better appraised in a
few years’ time. Inflation expectations are a key consideration for a central bank,
and so ways to more accurately measure these expectations should remain an im-
portant consideration for future research.
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Appendix
A. Deriving the Nelson-Siegel function (equation 3.6)
Equation 3.5 is integrated from 0 to m and divided by m:
1
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The derivation of the Svensson extension (equation 3.8) follows essentially the
same procedure.
